Indian Army took the blame for intelligence failure in Kargil. Still triumphed

Indian Army took the blame for intelligence failure in Kargil. Still triumphed

Twenty-five years ago, 527 soldiers made the supreme sacrifice while recapturing the Kargil heights, a mission impossible by all means. For many of us who have been a part of the Kargil War, we can claim with pride that the Indian Army and the Air Force achieved the near impossible.

Post the Kargil victory on 26 July 1999, the Indian Army, as is the norm, invited the Defence Attaches (DA) of various nations stationed in their respective Embassies and High Commissions in Delhi to visit Kargil-Drass-Kaksar-Batalik to brief them on the Kargil War. One of the DAs from a Western army, in awe and disbelief, said, “You have to be crazy to even attempt to attack these high features—we would have just nuked them.”

That’s the respect and regard the armies of the world hold for the Indian Army. The Indian Army is by far one of the most battle-hardened armies in the world, with an unparalleled success rate in war, internal security, disaster relief, UN peacekeeping operations and even intervention operations like Op Cactus (Maldives) and Op Pawan (Sri Lanka).

Army a soft target

Kargil intrusions have to be analysed in the backdrop of the politico-diplomatic initiatives of February 1999—Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s bus journey to Lahore followed by the signing of the Lahore declaration on 21 February 1999. As always, the Army took the blame for the intelligence failure, however, it is neither mandated nor resourced to obtain ‘strategic intelligence’.

In 1999, the Army did not have the resources to even gather credible operational intelligence. It is the mandate and responsibility of various intelligence agencies to continuously review our adversaries’ strategic intent and aims. In the spring of 1999, we obviously failed to discern Pakistan’s strategic intent and fissures within their political dispensation and the army.

Post the victory, the Kargil Review Committee headed by K Subrahmanyam, one of the nation’s leading strategists, followed by the Group of Ministers report went to great lengths in identifying the various causative factors and more importantly detailing the various structures and systems required to mitigate future national security threats. The Army on their part conducted various studies.

During the operations in July 1999,  then-Lt General Shankar Prasad, Director General Infantry, sent me to Kargil, to get first-hand feedback on the efficacy of the infantry operations from 28 Infantry units deployed in the Kargil War. What was heartening was the self-belief and the morale of our soldiers and their complete trust in the leaders. The report also reinforced the nation’s trust and confidence in the Army and its soldiers.

Unfortunately, the Indian Army over the years has become a soft target and a punching bag for some self-styled know-alls with little knowledge of the many challenges and constraints of the operating conditions of the Armed Forces. The Army has to live under media scrutiny and media glare where skewed narratives do more harm than good.

Recapturing Kargil heights

The Army’s silence on unfounded criticism on account of its discipline and orders is often taken amiss. It is seen as the Army’s admission to having failed the nation. It needs to be understood that the military is only one of the domains of national security and functions under political directions.

Militarily, the best option to recapture ‘Kargil Heights’ was to cut off the Burzil Pass-Franshet-Shaqma road, the single road axis and lifeline supporting the intrusions in Mushko-Drass-Kaksar-Kargil right up to Shingo River.

The 50 Independent Parachute Brigade under then Brigadier (later Northern Army Commander and Vice Chief) PC Bhardwaj with 1 PARA SF, 6 PARA and 7 PARA was deployed West of Mushko.

This would have starved the Pakistan army of the logistics required to sustain any deployment along the heights, forcing them to either surrender or withdraw. However, on account of geopolitical and geostrategic compulsions and rightly so, the Armed Forces were ordered not to cross the Line of Control (LoC).

This left no option for the Army but to launch infantry assaults at heights of 15,000 to 17,000 feet above mean sea level. Having operated on those heights, you climb up two steps and slip down one. Any enemy deployed on top could easily defend the features by just pushing down stones and rocks, leaving aside aimed fire.

The Indian Army captured features like Tololing, Tiger Hill, Jubar, Bajrang and the equally famous battle of Point 5140. The words immortalised by Captain Vikram Batra, code-named ‘Shershaah’,—‘Dil Maange More (The heart wants more)’—symbolised the warrior ethos of the Indian Army. The Pakistan Army was shell-shocked and taken by surprise by the sheer audacity and ferocity of the Indian assaults.

The induction of the 8 Mountain Division under the dynamic leadership of then Major General Mohinder Puri, a soldier and leader par excellence was a game changer. The Division went about its task of recapturing the peaks with unmatched professionalism and valour, with the Indian soldiers and leaders proving once again the old army dictum—“The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer”.

The troops were spurred on by numerous visits by then-Chief General VP Malik. For the first time, a responsible media played a vital role in the war, contributing to the victory, igniting the imagination and interests of all Indians and the world—literally bringing the battle to the bedrooms. The positive and real-time coverage by our media was definitely morale-boosting for the soldiers and our people, contributing to the victory. Information operations thus became an integral part of our strategy.

In the annals of military history, soldiers and scholars of the world over will continue to study and marvel at the recapture of the Kargil heights by the Indian Army. The sacrifices and valour of the soldiers and leaders remain unmatched in military history. As we celebrate the 25th ‘Kargil Vijay Diwas’, we pay homage to the 527 Indian soldiers who died in the process of making it possible.

Vikram Batra, Manoj Pandey, Sanjay Kumar, Yogendra Yadav, Anuj Nayyar, and Vijayant Thapar are among many other war heroes who will always be remembered by a grateful nation. During the many battles, 26 officers and 501 soldiers lived up to and fought for the ‘Naam, Namak and Nishan’ of their respective units and regiments. As we celebrate 25 years of Kargil, let us recollect the many sacrifices of the soldiers and air warriors who ensured victory against all odds.

Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (Retd) was former DGMO and Colonel of the Para regiment. He is currently the Director of the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), the official think tank of the tri-services.

(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)