Revisiting the basics of governance in education

Oped Template Joseph Noel M. Estrada

OUR education system is governed by DepEd, CHEd and Tesda, separate and independent from each other, and thus, is described as “trifocalized.” This “trifocalization” is the most notable recommendation of the First Congressional Commission on Education (Edcom 1) in 1991. More than three decades have passed, and now that Edcom 2 has been convened, a call for a review of the “trifocalized” system is one of those issues that always comes up.

While many of the discussions related to the study of the system focus on re-unifying or merging certain agencies or creating a new coordinating body, I would like to devote this column today to share some key principles in the governance of education. Without the proper appreciation of the essence of education governance, no amount of rearranging or overhauling of governance structures will fix any existing misgovernance in education.

In general, the governance of the education sector is limited to external governance by the State. External governance of educational institutions deals with the administrative relationship between the education agencies of the government and the educational institutions.

External governance as a function of government means setting quality standards for educational institutions and programs, promulgating the necessary rules to implement these standards, and enforcing regulatory powers to ensure compliance therewith.

External governance is essentially a regulatory function. This includes the power to monitor, investigate and impose sanctions whenever necessary, including the withholding and revocation of permits and government recognition of schools. This power, however, to supervise and regulate granted by law, despite being liberally construed, does not include adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. The essence of adjudication is the settlement of actual controversies of parties, the determination of their rights under the law, and the awarding of damages. DepEd, CHEd and Tesda are bereft of these adjudicatory powers by their enabling statutes.

Even in promulgating the necessary rules to implement enacted laws on education, the administrative agency cannot expand its jurisdiction to adjudicate education controversies without express authority from the law it seeks to implement.

In Miriam College Foundation Inc. v. CA, on the complaint of students pertaining to the Campus Journalism Act, the Supreme Court held that the issue was a question purely legal in nature and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court and not of the DECS (the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as the DepEd was then known). The Court also emphasized the requirement of reasonableness and that the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights. It does not include the power to control educational institutions. Thus, the Court declared that the power to investigate as an adjunct to its power to suspend or expel students belongs to the school and not to the DECS.

In University of Santo Tomas v. Sanchez, the Court was also explicit in holding that the CHEd lacks adjudicatory powers or such power to “investigate or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions.” Administrative agencies are not courts; neither are they part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHEd does not have the power to award damages. Certainly, Republic Act 7722 does not contain any express grant to the CHEd of judicial or quasi-judicial power.

Aside from the fact that the quasi-judicial function is not included in the DepEd and CHEd laws, the reason for the withholding of adjudicatory functions from these education agencies is also fundamental, grounded and anchored on the State’s exercise of reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions; and the guarantee of academic freedom for all institutions of higher learning.

In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, the Supreme Court underscores the importance of the academic judgment of educators and educational institutions on the qualification and competence of students in relation to their academic freedom. This academic judgment cannot be subject to judicial scrutiny except only when there is marked arbitrariness or when it is attended by grave abuse of discretion by the school authorities. “Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be swamped with petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and next, the thousands who flunked and were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their grades.”

It’s high time we revisit governance from the perspective of the Framers of our Constitution that when the latter speaks of reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions, it refers to external governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions, as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative officials. According to the Framers, external governance does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule, prohibit or dominate.

Be empowered!

The author regularly holds The Legal Mind Executive Sessions for teachers and school administrators. Email [email protected].