What does the future hold for Israel's future war with Hezbollah?

IDF soldiers train in the north of Israel in preparation for any future wars with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Whoever is at a loss about what the future holds for the Israel-Hezbollah conflict should not feel bad. The constant threats, varying verbiage, and increasing number of attacks back and forth are extremely difficult to cut through and understand.

However, after multiple recent visits to the North that included briefings with top officials, discussions with rank-and-file soldiers, and checking in with other key sources, The Jerusalem Post can “translate” and separate the important developments from the less crucial ones.

Neither side is interested in general war 

First of all, despite a rise in threats from both the Israeli and the Hezbollah sides, neither is actually angling to open up a much larger general war anytime soon.

This sounds counterintuitive after days in which multiple top Israeli officials said that Israel and Hezbollah are closer to conflict than ever and Hezbollah Chief Hassan Nasrallah has himself rattled his saber more loudly in each speech.

AN IDF soldier stands near the Israel-Lebanon border as a mobile artillery unit fires toward Hezbollah targets, on Monday. (credit: RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS)

AN IDF soldier stands near the Israel-Lebanon border as a mobile artillery unit fires toward Hezbollah targets, on Monday. (credit: RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS)

But if you compare Israeli and Hezbollah statements from several weeks ago, they were not that different.

Most of it is a smokescreen for each side to try to gain the upper hand in the competition for who is perceived as winning so far and who will be able to declare victory whenever the conflict ends.

Actions louder than words

However, there are some actions and facts that matter far more than words.

In recent weeks, the IDF has attacked close to 15 villages that Hezbollah was using for cover to fire on Israel’s North.

During the middle of last week, the IDF significantly upped its level of attack when it fired on Hezbollah fighters and positions at the Wadi Saluki Village dozens of times in a matter of hours.

Until then, the IDF had mostly done much smaller-scale attacks on the villages. This was after months during which the IDF did not strike the villages at all and had been willing only to attack Hezbollah rocket crews in open areas.

This shift has hurt Hezbollah and forced it to recalibrate its calculations regarding how to continue firing on Israel; it was much more important than any verbiage.

The result was that the IDF, as of around a month ago, had pushed about 50% of Hezbollah’s 6,000 Radwan forces back from the border with Israel, and that percentage is now closer to 75%, The Post has learned.

The Post also understands that the IDF has been even more successful in destroying Hezbollah’s watchtowers on the border – destroying or damaging between 80 and 95% of them, depending on what one considers damaged versus destroyed.

Besides carrying out that grand scale of military actions that changes the playing field, the IDF admitted to assassinating Hezbollah drone chief Ali Hussein Bergi, and the terrorist group has accused Jerusalem of killing Hezbollah’s Radwan chief, Wissam al-Tawil.

These killings did not change the situation on the ground as much as the military actions did, but they were a direct hit on Nasrallah’s confidence, making it clearer than any verbiage that the IDF is willing to take off the gloves – even against top Hezbollah officials – if the terrorist group crosses certain redlines.

War with Hezbollah unlikely in the foreseeable future 

Why, then, is a general war unlikely in the near future?

From Nasrallah’s perspective, he does not need a bigger war to claim victory. He succeeded in forcing some 80,000 Israelis to evacuate the North and has shown that he can maintain fire on Israel for more than 100 days without making a dent in his arsenal of some 150,000 rockets and mortars.

All he needs to do is try not to lose face or give up too much before a new ceasefire kicks into place.

And while he views the world differently than Westerners, he certainly prefers not to have Beirut and Lebanon look like the significantly destroyed Gaza Strip.

Israel and the IDF leadership, for their part, are highly split on what to do with Hezbollah.

All of the key political and defense officials are in favor of trying to negotiate a diplomatic deal, according to which Hezbollah would withdraw 100% of its Radwan forces from the border with Israel, with war only as a second choice.

However, some in the IDF think that a firm ultimatum and deadline should be given to Hezbollah sooner rather than later.

Some top IDF officials who, before the war, might have been leaning more aggressively toward attacking Hezbollah very soon – with a preemptive strike to start what they viewed as an inevitable conflict on Israeli terms – now, counter-intuitively, may be willing to wait for a later date.

While some IDF officials view Hezbollah’s actions – injecting itself into the war between Israel and Hamas and forcing the evacuation of Israel’s northern residents for over 100 days – as an effrontery that must be corrected immediately, others believe that Israel’s actions in the last month or so have altered the picture.

Having pushed back such a substantial amount of Hezbollah’s forces, they feel the chance of the terrorist group mounting an attack is the lowest it has been in years and that it buys more time for the IDF to delay a preemptive strike to some more opportune moment in the distant future.

Still, others are terrified of what Hezbollah can do to Israel’s home front if it releases its full arsenal, even though Israel would doubtlessly “win” such a conflict in terms of killing and destroying more Hezbollah forces and infrastructure in absolute terms. Put simply, they view Israel as less able than the Lebanese terrorist group to tolerate losses to the home front.

Weather also matters, and fighting a big war mid-winter could hurt Israel’s ability to exploit its higher-quality military capabilities.

Finally, some do not want to start a major fight with Hezbollah until either Khan Yunis is subdued, still months away, or at an even later date when Gaza is stabilized and beyond an immediate risk of Hamas returning to take over.

Israeli actions have set Hezbollah back significantly, but have also been tailored to be clearly limited from upsetting Hezbollah beyond a certain point.

A general war could still break out tomorrow if one side or another miscalculates and pushes the other too far. But in the meantime, readers will get a more accurate picture by watching the actions of both sides, both what they do and what they do not do, than by the bellicose speeches that continue to repeat themselves.