The Guardian view on the new drone wars: as prices fall, casualties mount

Houses and cars destroyed in a fire following an attack by Russia’s Shahed drones in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on 12 February 2024. Photograph: Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto/Rex/Shutterstock

Three days into his presidency, Barack Obama ordered his first drone strikes. Over the next eight years, he oversaw a massive expansion of the US programme of targeted killings using armed drones. The initial appeal was that the US did not risk its personnel, and strikes could be carried out without attracting much attention and, supposedly, with more precision – though civilian deaths were ignored or played down.

But in the ensuing years, drone wars have undergone a dramatic evolution. Never before have so many drones been used, so intensely. The US programme relied on expensive Predator drones costing about $12m (£9.5m). But much cheaper drones made by Turkey, Iran and China have been credited for victories, including Ethiopia’s reversal of the rapid advance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and for damaging attacks by non-state actors. In 2021, Gen Kenneth McKenzie, then commander of US Central Command, observed: “For the first time since the Korean war, we are operating without complete air superiority.”

The picture has come even more starkly into focus since he spoke. In Ukraine and Myanmar, commercial drones designed for hobbyists or agriculture and costing just a few hundred dollars have been equipped for attacks, aiding the underdog in asymmetric conflicts. (The Royal United Services Institute estimated last year that Ukraine was losing 10,000 drones a month.) Myanmar’s junta is struggling to hold on to the country after three years of civil war, with drones playing a key role. Two weeks ago, more sophisticated Ukrainian sea drones, reportedly costing tens of thousands of dollars, sank a Russian warship worth tens of millions in the Black Sea.

The importance of the new breed of armed drones should not be overstated. Most of them fail in their missions. The damage they can inflict is minimal compared with missiles. They are often most effective for symbolic strikes or damage to economic infrastructure, such as power networks, and when used alongside conventional weapons. A 2019 drone and missile attack on oil-processing facilities – claimed by Houthis, though others had their doubts – temporarily halved Saudi Arabia’s oil production.

Using drones has also enabled Ukraine to hit targets deep in Russian territory, which it is not allowed to do with donated weapons. And even when the devices are intercepted, the cost can be punitive: Shahed drones used by Houthi rebels cost around £16,000, while Sea Viper missiles used by the British navy to fend them off cost upwards of £1m. The effectiveness of armed drones is sufficiently evident that Russia has adopted Ukraine’s techniques itself. The US military is also looking to invest in large numbers of cheap drones alongside its multimillion-dollar Reapers.

The dangers are mounting as technology develops: one major concern is powerful AI-enabled drone swarms of multiple devices communicating with each other autonomously. The risk of these in the hands of terrorist groups is particularly stark. Islamic State was an early adopter of attack drones.

Though some actors will not be bound by rules, the rapid proliferation demands serious international discussion of drone use, rather than just unilateral codes – however hard that is to envision under current circumstances. The US drone wars showed how unarmed aerial vehicles increased secrecy around military missions, reduced accountability and, critically, lowered the threshold for the use of force. Proper regulation of their use, including human oversight and greater transparency, is essential.