The Houthis are holding the world to ransom through the Red Sea attacks

PROTESTERS, MAINLY Houthi supporters, rally to show support for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, in Sanaa, Yemen, this past Friday.

The Houthis – whose flag proclaims, among other things, “Death to Israel, a curse on the Jews” – operate from the chunk of western Yemen that they have seized from Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) – comprised of Yemeni state institutions recognized by the international community since February 2015. It is a well-populated area, home to the capital, Sana’a, and a great length of coastline bordering the Red Sea, including the vital port of Hodeidah.

For the past 10 years the Houthis, intent on extending their grip over the entire country, have been locked in a civil war which, despite various well-intentioned peace brokering efforts, has so far resulted in a virtual stalemate.

As a result, their standing among the hard-pressed Yemenis had recently been on the slide and they had been competing for popular support against the IRG and the other main protagonist in Yemen’s political struggles – the so-called Southern Transitional Council (STC). Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, who founded the STC and is its president, has set his sights on establishing an independent state of South Yemen.

Hamas’s incursion into Israel on October 7 and its massacre of 1,200 people provided the Houthis with a completely unexpected political advantage.

As the news of the attack broke, the Houthis – needing little prompting from their Iranian paymasters since February 2015 – virtually declared war on Israel in support. It was no doubt at Iran’s behest that the Houthis went on to plan a series of assaults on Israel. Not all went according to plan. Three cruise missiles fired from Yemen on October 19 were intercepted by the US Navy. A drone attack launched on October 28 apparently went off-course and resulted in explosions in Egypt.

Newly recruited fighters who joined a Houthi military force intended to be sent to fight in support of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, march during a parade in Sanaa, Yemen December 2, 2023. (credit: REUTERS/KHALED ABDULLAH)

Newly recruited fighters who joined a Houthi military force intended to be sent to fight in support of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, march during a parade in Sanaa, Yemen December 2, 2023. (credit: REUTERS/KHALED ABDULLAH)

Since then, claiming that they are acting to force the international community to halt Israel’s offensive in Gaza, the Houthis have begun a campaign of missile and armed drone attacks on commercial ships transiting the Red Sea. Operation Prosperity Guardian, the maritime security coalition of more than 20 nations, set up by the United States in December 2023, has done nothing to deter them, nor has the deployment of European Union, or even Chinese maritime forces off the coast of Yemen.

Campaign to deter Houthis

In mid-January, following more than 20 Houthi attacks on commercial ships, the US and the United Kingdom led a 14-nation campaign to “degrade and deter” the Houthi attacks by striking Houthi missile and drone launch and storage facilities, extending this to associated targets such as radar and air defense installations. When this too proved ineffective, in late January they began attacking Houthi weaponry being prepared for launch against commercial shipping. By early February, US-led strikes had destroyed more than 100 missiles and launches, including anti-ship missiles, drones, radars, unmanned waterborne drones, and other equipment.

Whatever the effect of this on the Houthis’ total military capacity, there has been no appreciable reduction in their bellicose operations. They have, if anything, stepped up their aggressive activity. On February 18, they conducted their first strike against the crew of a commercial sea vessel, forcing them to abandon ship. Struck by a missile, the Belize-flagged, UK-registered vessel Rubymar finally sunk on March 3.

The Houthi attacks, threatening freedom of navigation and global commerce, have led many shipping lines to take the longer Europe-Far East route around South Africa, avoiding the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. According to the United Nations, in the first half of February, the Suez Canal experienced a 42% drop in monthly transits and an 82% decrease in container tonnage compared to its peak in 2023. Meanwhile, commercial vessels have been rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope for almost two months, leading to a near doubling of vessel transits in the region and a 75% increase in trade volume. Rerouting maritime traffic in this way can add 12-20 days to the journey.

THIS FAILURE of the world’s leading military powers to deter the Houthis still lacks a convincing explanation. There is no evidence that the Houthis have been resupplied by Iran, following the degradation in their military hardware from Western action. The US-led maritime coalition has intercepted numerous shipments from Iran, but whether additional deliveries to the Houthis are slipping through remains unknown. The Houthis’ original stockpile of weaponry may have been far higher than originally estimated.

How should the West proceed? One approach under consideration is to concentrate on reviving the peace talks between the warring parties in Yemen, pushing for a political settlement that would include an end to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Another is to escalate the attacks on the entire Houthi military machine and defeat them by overwhelming force. How Iran might act in such a scenario is the great unknown.

The respected US independent non-profit think tank and research body, The Soufan Center, believes that as of the end of February, calls in Washington for a significant escalation directly against Houthi forces in Yemen have been gaining momentum. It reports that prominent experts and some former US officials “are calling for US support for ground combat operations against the Houthis as the only means of forcing the movement to alter its policies.”

The argument runs that the US and its allies will have to threaten something more valuable to the Houthis than the prestige they derive from attacking commercial shipping. The only thing that reaches that threshold is Houthi control of Yemeni territory. Thus, consideration is being given to massively boosting the anti-Houthi forces engaged in the civil war. It is appreciated that supporting a direct attack on Houthi-held territory would entail a great many risks. Of greater significance is that it would add to the misery of the Yemeni population, already the victims of a massive humanitarian catastrophe.

Yet despite the negative consequences, the Soufan Center believes that the perceived threat the Houthis now pose to US and Western vital interests virtually guarantees that calls for an alternative to the current approach will continue to gather strength.

There is a chink of hope. When the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza comes to an end, as it must eventually do, the Houthis might seize the opportunity to withdraw from holding the world to ransom.

The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land:  2016-2020. Follow him at: a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.